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Abstract
We consider a linear dynamical system in which the state vector consists of both public and private
states. One or more sensors make measurements of the state vector and sends information to a fusion
center, which performs the final state estimation. To achieve an optimal tradeoff between the utility
of estimating the public states and protection of the private states, the measurements at each time
step are linearly compressed into a lower dimensional space. Under the centralized setting where all
measurements are collected by a single sensor, we propose an optimization problem and an algorithm
to find the best compression matrix. Under the decentralized setting where measurements are made
separately at multiple sensors, each sensor optimizes its own local compression matrix. We propose
methods to separate the overall optimization problem into multiple sub-problems that can be solved
locally at each sensor. We consider the cases where there is no message exchange between the sensors;
and where each sensor takes turns to transmit messages to the other sensors. Simulations and empirical
experiments demonstrate the efficiency of our proposed approach in allowing the fusion center to estimate
the public states with good accuracy while preventing it from estimating the private states accurately.
Index Terms
Inference privacy, compressive privacy, parameter privacy, linear dynamical system, Kalman filter.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the emerging Internet of Things (IoT) paradigm, large numbers of sensors are deployed
in modern infrastructures, such as smart grids, population health monitoring, traffic monitoring,
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2online recommendation systems, etc. [1]–[6]. These sensors make observations and send data
like the level of power consumption, sickness symptoms, or GPS coordinates in real-time to a
fusion center [7]–[11], thus allowing utility companies and other service providers to improve
their service offerings. However, some privacy-sensitive information such as personal activities,
behaviors, preferences, habits and health conditions can be inferred from the raw measurements
collected from individuals. For example, in a smart grid infrastructure, customers could be
offered better rates if they continuously send their instantaneous power consumption to the utility
company, which helps to improve the demand forecasting mechanism. However, from the fine-
grained smart meter readings, the customers’ private activities such as when and for how long
appliances are used can be inferred [12]–[14]. Another example is the inference of individuals’
private ratings or preferences from temporal changes in public recommendation systems [15],
[16]. In traffic monitoring systems, individual users send anonymized personal location traces,
which can be GPS coordinates measured by their smartphones, to a data aggregator to aid in
traffic state estimation. However, an adversary may link an anonymous GPS trace to a particular
person provided the knowledge of the person’s residence and/or working location [17]–[20].
Therefore, it is essential to develop privacy preserving mechanisms to protect private state
information from being inferred while retaining the quality of services that depend on the sensor
measurements. All the above mentioned applications involve dynamic and time-varying data
streams instead of static data sets.
In this paper, we consider a linear dynamical system (LDS) in which one or more sensors
make measurements of the evolving state vector, and send information to a fusion center that
makes the final state estimation. Suppose some of the states contain sensitive information. We
call these states the private states, while the remaining states are public states. Our goal is to
allow the fusion center to estimate the public states while making it difficult for it to estimate
the private states. To achieve this, each sensor sanitizes its measurement to remove statistical
information about the private states before sending it to the fusion center. A naive approach is
for each sensor to first estimate the public states and send only this information to the fusion
center. Such an approach does not prevent statistical inference of the private states at a future
time step since in a LDS, the public states at one time step may provide statistical information
about the private states in a future time step. Furthermore, when there are more than one sensor,
it may not be possible for each individual sensor to estimate the public states. There is therefore
a need to investigate the optimal way to sanitize information to achieve the best tradeoff between
3the utility of estimating the public states and the protection of the private states over all time
steps. In this paper, we consider the use of a linear transformation or compression to map the
sensor measurements into a lower dimensional space as the sanitization procedure. We call this
compressive privacy [21].
A. Related Work
In general, privacy can be categorized into two classes: data privacy and inference privacy
[22]–[25]. Data privacy protects the original measurements from being inferred by fusion center.
The privacy metrics that have been proposed for preserving data privacy in a sensor network
include homomorphic encryption [26]–[28], k-anonymity [29], plausible deniability [30] and
local differential privacy [31]–[35]. Inference privacy on the other hand, prevents the fusion
center from making certain statistical inferences. The privacy metrics that have been proposed to
achieve inference privacy include information privacy [23], [25], [36], [37], differential privacy
[38]–[40], Blowfish privacy [41], mutual information privacy [42], [43] and average information
leakage [44], [45]. The relationship between data privacy and inference privacy has been studied
in [24], [42].
The type of privacy we consider in this paper can be considered to be a form of inference
privacy since we wish to prevent the fusion center from inferring about the private states. The
aforementioned inference privacy metrics like information privacy, differential privacy, mutual
information privacy and average information leakage either assume a finite state alphabet (and
are thus more applicable in a hypothesis testing context instead of an estimation context), or
do not directly guarantee that the fusion center cannot estimate the private states to within a
certain error, making the choice of the privacy budgets in these metrics unclear and unintuitive.
Furthermore, although quantities like mutual information have relationships with estimation error,
they are not as easy to work with in a LDS where we consider privacy over multiple time steps.
Therefore, in this paper, we define privacy on the estimation error variance instead, and require
that the estimation error variances of the private states to be above a predefined threshold.
The papers [46]–[49] proposed to extract the relevant aspects of the data by the information
bottleneck (IB) approach. Given the joint distribution of a “source" variable z and another
“relevance" variable y, IB compresses z to obtain z˜ = Cz, while preserving information about
y. IB tradeoffs the complexity of the representation of z, measured by the mutual information
I(z; z˜) , against the accuracy of this representation measured by I(y; z˜). The compression is
4designed to make I(z; z˜) small and I(y; z˜) large. We can interpret y to be the public state or
information while z to be the private state. The privacy funnel (PF) method [50] uses a mapping
from the source variable z to z˜ = Cz so that I(y; z˜) is small and I(z; z˜) is large. PF operates in
a way that is opposite to IB by treating y as the private state. Both IB and PF do not consider
information over multiple time steps, and are not directly applicable to a LDS without additional
prior information about the LDS evolution.
The papers [21], [51]–[56] introduced the concept of compressive privacy (CP), which is a
dimension-reducing subspace approach. They considered the case where the source variable z
can be mapped as Γ(P)z to the utility subspace and as Γ(Q)z to the privacy subspace, where
Γ(P) and Γ(Q) are projection matrices. Under the assumption that z has a Gaussian distribution,
the compression matrix C is designed to achieve an optimal privacy-utility tradeoff based on
I(Γ(P)z; z˜) and I(Γ(Q)z; z˜), where z˜ = Cz. In the case where the projection matrices Γ(P) and
Γ(Q) are unknown, a machine learning approach is proposed to learn the compression matrix
C from a set of training data. Our formulation is similar to [21], except that we assume that
the underlying state vector generating the measurement z can be divided into public and private
states, instead of the measurement z being mapped into utility and privacy subspaces. A more
detailed technical discussion of the differences is provided in Section II. Furthermore, different
from [21], [51]–[53] which considers z to be a single-shot observation, we consider a LDS in
which observations are temporally correlated, and our goal is to preserve the privacy of the
private states over multiple future time steps.
The references [57], [58] developed differential privacy mechanisms for the measurements zk,
k = 1, 2, . . ., in a LDS. The authors of [57] proposed to use an input perturbation mechanism
so that z˜k = zk + νk, where νk is white Gaussian noise, is used in place of zk at each time
step k to guarantee (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy for the original measurement zk. The paper [58]
proposed to apply an input perturbation mechanism together with a linear transformation, i.e.,
z˜k = Czk + νk. By adding white Gaussian noise νk according to the Gaussian mechanism
[59], Czk is differentially private. The transformation matrix C is designed to minimize the
mean-square error (MSE) of the states. These papers’ objectives are to preserve the differential
privacy of the system measurements, which is different from our goal of preventing the statistical
inference of a subset of states.
The authors in [60] proposed to project an observation z into a lower dimensional space to
obtain z˜ = Cz. The transformation C is designed to maximally retain the estimation accuracy
5of the entire system’s state and the dimension of the space projected into is predefined. This
work also does not consider preserving the estimation privacy of a subset of states in a LDS.
B. Our Contributions
In this paper, we consider the use of a compressive linear transformation on the measurements
at one or multiple sensors in a LDS to prevent the fusion center from estimating a set of private
states with low error while still allowing it to estimate a set of public states with good accuracy.
Our main contributions are as follows.
(i) We formulate a utility-privacy tradeoff optimization problem for a LDS involving privacy
constraints on the predicted estimation error of the private states multiple steps ahead. We
show how to find the dimension of the compressive map and the map itself and propose
an algorithm to achieve this. We provide a bound for the number of steps to look ahead to
achieve the same privacy level in all future time steps.
(ii) We consider the case where there are multiple decentralized sensors that optimize their
own local compressive map. We propose optimization methods for the cases where 1) there
are no message exchanges between the sensors; and 2) each sensor takes turns to transmit
messages to the other sensors.
(iii) We present extensive simulation results that demonstrate that imposing privacy constraints
multiple steps ahead is necessary in some LDSs, and examine the impact of different
choices of the state evolution and measurement matrices on the utility-privacy tradeoff.
We also verify the performance of our proposed approach on an empirical ultra wideband
(UWB) localization system and human activity recognition data set.
A preliminary version of this work was presented in [61] in which only the single sensor case
with a single step look-ahead privacy constraint was considered. This paper generalizes [61]
to the case where there are multiple decentralized sensors with multi-step look-ahead privacy
constraints. New theoretical insights and numerical results are also presented in this paper.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we present our problem formula-
tion, assumptions and an optimization framework to achieve an optimal utility-privacy tradeoff.
In Section III, we propose a centralized solution to find the compression matrix that optimizes
the utility-privacy tradeoff at each time step. In Section IV, we consider the decentralized case
where multiple sensors are involved and proposed different optimization approaches. We present
simulation results in Section V, and conclude in Section VII.
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SUMMARY OF COMMONLY-USED SYMBOLS.
Notation Definition
P = {1, . . . , |P|} index set of the |P| public states
Q = {|P|+ 1, . . . , L} index set of the |Q| = L− |P| private states
xk, zk state and measurement vector at time k, respectively
Fk ∈ R
L×L, Hk ∈ R
N×L state evolution and measurement matrices at time k, (1)
Qk , Rk state and measurement noise covariances at time k, (1)
Ck ∈ R
M×N compression matrix applied to the measurement at time k, (7)
P˜k+n|k n-step prediction error covariance matrix after compression at time k, (13)
Tk = HkP˜k|k−1H
⊺
k +Rk, (15)
Gk+n|k = HkP˜k|k−1F
⊺
k+1:k+n, (16)
Dk+n|k P˜k+n|k − P˜k+n|k−1, error reduction due to measurement made at time k, (19)
τk(Ck) public error trace at time k , (8)
ηk+n|k(Ck) n-step look-ahead private error function at time k with ηk = ηk|k , (14)
uk(Ck) utility at time k, (22)
ℓk+n|k(Ck) n-step look ahead privacy loss at time k, (23)
Notations: We use R to denote the set of real numbers. The normal distribution with mean µ
and variance σ2 is denoted as N (0, σ2). min(a) is the minimum element in the vector a, 1n is
the vector of all 1’s of length n, and In is the identity matrix of size n×n. We use
⊺ to represent
matrix transpose, diag(A,B, . . .) to represent a block diagonal matrix with submatricesA,B, . . .
being the diagonal elements, Tr(·) to denote the trace operation, and vecdiag(A) to denote a
column vector consisting of diagonal entries of A. We use [A]P,Q to denote the sub-matrix of
matrix A consisting of the entries A(i, j) for all (i, j) ∈ P ×Q, [A]:,Q to denote the sub-matrix
of matrix A consisting of columns indexed by Q, and [A]P to denote the sub-matrix of matrix
A consisting of rows indexed by P . Given a set of n×n matrices Ai,Ai+1, . . . ,Aj , we use Ai:j
to denote the matrix product AjAj−1 · · ·Ai if i ≤ j, and define Ai:j = In if i > j. The notation
A  0 means that A is positive semidefinite. Let A⊥ denote the basis matrix of the null space
of A, i.e., A⊺A⊥ = 0. For easier reference, we summarize some of the commonly-used symbols
in Table I.
7II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
We consider a LDS given by the following state and measurement equations at time step k:
xk = Fkxk−1 + vk, (1a)
zk = Hkxk + nk, (1b)
where xk ∈ RL and zk ∈ RN are the system’s state and measurement at time k, respectively. The
state and process noise vk and nk are independent, and follow zero-mean Gaussian distributions
with positive definite covariances Qk and Rk, respectively. We assume that the state evolution
matrices Fk ∈ RL×L are known for all k, and the measurement matrices {Hj ∈ RN×L : j ≤ k},
where N ≥ L are known only up to the current time step k. This assumption is made because in
many applications like target tracking [62]–[64], the measurement matrixHk is chosen adaptively
at each time step k.
Another example is estimation over lossy networks where the measurement matrices are time-
varying [65], [66]. On their routes to the gateway, sensor packets, possibly aggregated with
measurements from several nodes, may become intermittent because of time-varying transmission
intervals or delays [67], [68], packet dropouts [68]–[76], random message exchanges depending
on the availability of appropriate network links [77], fading channels [78], and other communica-
tion constraints [79]. The measurement matrixHk is thus unknown until the sensor measurements
are received at time k.
To obtain the minimum mean square estimate of the system state in (1), it is well known
[80] that the Kalman filter is optimal. The Kalman filter contains two distinct phases: “predict"
and “update". In the “predict" phase, the state estimate and error covariance are predicted,
respectively, by
xˆk|k−1 = Fkxˆk−1|k−1, (2)
Pk|k−1 = FkPk−1|k−1F
⊺
k +Qk. (3)
In the “update" phase, the state estimate and error covariance are updated, respectively, through
xˆk|k = xˆk−1|k−1 +Kk(zk −Hkxˆk|k−1), (4)
Pk|k = (I−KkHk)Pk|k−1, (5)
where Kk = Pk|k−1H
⊺
k
(
HkPk|k−1H
⊺
k +Rk
)−1
denotes the Kalman gain.
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xk =

[xk]P
[xk]Q

 , (6)
where [xk]P ∈ R
|P|, with P = {1, . . . , |P|} and |P| < L, contains the public states that are to
be estimated, while [xk]Q ∈ R
|Q|, with Q = {|P| + 1, . . . , L} and |Q| = L − |P| > 0, are the
private states containing sensitive information that we wish to protect. Our goal is to minimize
the estimation errors of the public states
[
xˆk|k
]
P
, while ensuring that the estimation errors of
private states
[
xˆk|k
]
Q
are above a predefined threshold.
In [21], it is assumed that the measurement or feature vector zk can be mapped as Γ
(P)zk to a
utility subspace and as Γ(Q)zk to a privacy subspace. Our formulation is equivalent to a variant
of the formulation in [21] if there is no additive noise nk in (1b), and [Hk]:,P is orthogonal
to [Hk]:,Q, but is in general different from [21]. The advantage of our formulation is that in
applications with a known LDS model, it is easier to specify which system states are public and
private directly instead of through the measurements or observed features. Furthermore, to apply
the formulation from [21] to a LDS where we want to protect the privacy of some states over
multiple time steps, will require prior knowledge of the measurement matrices Hj for j ≥ k,
where k is the current time step. In particular, such an approach is impractical if j is large.
To prevent the fusion center from inferring the private states [xk]Q, we assume that a linear
mapping or compression matrix Ck ∈ R
M×N , where 1 ≤M ≤ N , is applied to the measurement
to obtain
z˜k = Ckzk = CkHkxk +Cknk. (7)
Let P˜k|k be the state error covariance based on the measurements z˜k′ , where k
′ ≤ k.
A smaller P˜k|k(i, i) implies that the i-th state can be estimated with lower error on average.
Therefore, as the utility, we aim to minimize the sum of the expected estimation errors of the
public states or the public error trace at time k defined as
τk (Ck) = Tr
([
P˜k|k
]
P,P
)
. (8)
On the other hand, the private error function at time k is defined as
ηk (Ck) = F
(
vecdiag
([
P˜k|k
]
Q,Q
))
, (9)
9where F(x) = Ax : R|Q| → R|F| is a user-defined linear map such that F(a) ≤ F(b) if a ≤ b,
with ≤ here denoting element-wise inequality. The non-decreasing property follows iff A has
non-negative entries.
For example, if F(x) = 1T|Q|x with |F| = 1, the private error function is the sum of the
private states’ error variances and
ηk (Ck) = Tr
([
P˜k|k
]
Q,Q
)
. (10)
If the privacy of every private state is important, we can choose F(x) = IQx and |F| = |Q|.
Then, the private error function becomes
ηk (Ck) = vecdiag
([
P˜k|k
]
Q,Q
)
. (11)
At each time k, we seek to optimize the privacy-utility tradeoff myopically as follows:
min
Ck
τk(Ck), (P0)
s.t. ηk(Ck) ≥ F(δ1|Q|),
where δ is a predefined threshold, and the minimization is over the set of compression matrices
{Ck : Ck ∈ RM , 1 ≤M ≤ N}. Note that we are optimizing over Ck as well as its dimension,
i.e., M , at every time step and (P0) is solved sequentially for each time step k.
The private error function given in (11) is more restrictive than that given in (10). In many
practical problems, the private information depends on all the private states so that protecting
some (but not necessarily all) of the private states may be sufficient to protect the overall private
information. For example, to protect someone’s geo-location information, which consists of x-,
y- and z- coordinates, it may be sufficient in some applications to obfuscate just one or two
coordinates instead of all three to achieve reasonable geo-location privacy. This motivates the
use of the private error trace in (10) as one potential privacy measure.
Problem (P0) focuses on the privacy-utility tradeoff at the current time step without taking
into account the future time steps. As the predicted error covariance P˜k+1|k relates to the error
covariance P˜k|k through (3), i.e.,
P˜k+1|k = Fk+1P˜k|kF
⊺
k+1 +Qk+1, (12)
Ck affects not just the privacy-utility tradeoff at the current time step k, but also the tradeoff at
future time steps. This is illustrated in an example below.
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Example 1. Consider the case where [Fk]P,P = 0 and [Fk]Q,Q = 0, i.e.,
Fk =

 0 [Fk]P,Q
[Fk]Q,P 0

 .
Recall that the prediction error covariance Pk|k−1 is related to Pk−1|k−1 via (3). Substituting
Fk into (2) and (3) yields
 [xˆk|k−1]P[
xˆk|k−1
]
Q

 =

 [Fk]P,Q [xˆk−1|k−1]Q
[Fk]Q,P
[
xˆk−1|k−1
]
P

 ,
Pk|k−1 =

 [Fk]P,Q [Pk−1|k−1]Q,Q [Fk]Q,P ∗
∗ [Fk]Q,P
[
Pk−1|k−1
]
P,P
[Fk]P,Q

+Qk.
We see that the state evolution matrix Fk converts the public state at time k − 1 into a linear
function of the private state at time k, and vice versa. This means that if a low public error
trace is achieved at time k − 1, then a low private error function value at time k is inevitable
if (P0) is used to design the utility-privacy tradeoff. This example shows that it is necessary to
incorporate privacy constraints for future time steps into (P0).
Since the dynamical model (1a) is publicly known, we may predict the system’s state n time
steps in the future. The n-step prediction error covariance P˜k+n|k at time k is given by
P˜k+n|k = Fk+1:k+nP˜k|kF
⊺
k+1:k+n +
n∑
i=1
Fk+i+1:k+nQk+iF
⊺
k+i+1:k+n. (13)
The look-ahead private error function at time k + n can be defined as
ηk+n|k(Ck) = F
(
vecdiag
([
P˜k+n|k
]
Q,Q
))
. (14)
Incorporating privacy constraints on the prediction error covariance rk steps ahead, we have
the following optimization problem at each time step k:
min
Ck
τk(Ck), (P1)
s.t. ηk+n|k(Ck) ≥ F(δ1|Q|), n = 0, . . . , rk,
where ηk|k = ηk in (9). When rk = 0, (P1) becomes (P0). Note again that (P1) is solved
sequentially or myopically at each time step k, with the minimization over {Ck : Ck ∈ R
M , 1 ≤
M ≤ N}.
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Let
Tk = HkP˜k|k−1H
⊺
k +Rk, (15)
and for n ≥ 0, let
Gk+n|k = HkP˜k|k−1F
⊺
k+1:k+n. (16)
We define
Dk+n|k = Fk+1:k+nDk|kF
⊺
k+1:k+n, (17)
where
Dk|k = P˜k|k−1 − P˜k|k
= G⊺k|kC
⊺
k (CkTkC
⊺
k)
−1
CkGk|k (18)
is the reduction of the error covariance due to the measurement made at time k. From (17)
and (18), we obtain
Dk+n|k = G
⊺
k+n|kC
⊺
k (CkTkC
⊺
k)
−1
CkGk+n|k. (19)
From (13) and (17), we have
P˜k+n|k = P˜k+n|k−1 −Dk+n|k. (20)
Replacing n by n + 1 and k by k − 1 in (13), and applying (12), we obtain
P˜k+n|k−1 =Fk+1:k+nP˜k|k−1F
⊺
k+1:k+n +
n∑
i=1
Fk+i+1:k+nQk+iF
⊺
k+i+1:k+n. (21)
Therefore, P˜k+n|k−1 does not depend on Ck. We can now define the utility to be
uk(Ck) = Tr
([
P˜k|k−1
]
P,P
)
− τk(Ck) = Tr
([
Dk|k
]
P,P
)
, (22)
and the n-step look-ahead privacy loss function at time k as
ℓk+n|k(Ck) = F
(
vecdiag
([
P˜k+n|k−1
]
Q,Q
))
− ηk+n|k(Ck)
= F
(
vecdiag
([
Dk+n|k
]
Q,Q
))
. (23)
Problem (P1) can then be equivalently recast as
max
Ck
uk(Ck) (P2)
s.t. ℓk+n|k(Ck) ≤ F
(
δ¯k+n
)
, n = 0, . . . , rk,
12
where
δ¯k+n = vecdiag
([
P˜k+n|k−1
]
Q,Q
)
− δ1|Q| (24)
is the n-step privacy loss threshold. From Example 1, we see that a sufficiently large rk at the
current time step k is required to ensure that there exists a Ct such that ηt|t(Ct) ≥ F(δ1|Q|) for
all future time steps t > k. In the following, we provide a lower bound for rk under different
assumptions. We start off with an elementary lemma.
Lemma 1. Consider a matrix A and square matrix B. Suppose AA⊺  αI and B  βI, then
ABA⊺  αβI, where α and β are non-negative scalars.
Proof: Since B − βI  0, we have A (B− βI)A⊺  0. From AA⊺ − αI  0, we obtain
ABA⊺ − αβI  0, which completes the proof.
Proposition 1. Suppose that at the current time step k, P˜k|k−1  νkI for some νk > 0. Suppose
also that for all t ≥ k, Qt  ǫI for some ǫ > 0, and FtF
⊺
t  ξI for some ξ > 0. Then if either
(i) ξ ≥ 1, or
(ii) ξ < 1, F(δ1|Q|) ≤
ǫ
1−ξ
F
(
1|Q|
)
, and νk <
ǫ
1−ξ
,
and 1
rk ≥ rk,⋆
, min
r≥0
{
r : F
(
1|Q|
)(
ǫ
1− ξr
1− ξ
+ ξrνk
)
≥ F(δ1|Q|)
}
− 1, (25)
there exists Ct such that ηt′|t(Ct) ≥ F(δ1|Q|), for all t′ ≥ t ≥ k.
Proof:
From (20), we have for all t′ ≥ t ≥ k, P˜t′|k−1  P˜t′|t. If[
P˜t′|k−1
]
Q,Q
 δI|Q|, (26)
we can always choose Ct = 0 so that
[
P˜t′|t
]
Q,Q
=
[
P˜t′|k−1
]
Q,Q
 δI|Q|, which along with
the non-decreasing property of F implies that ηt′|t(Ct) ≥ F(δ1|Q|). We next show that the
conditions given in the proposition statement lead to (26).
1We define 1−ξ
r
1−ξ
∣
∣
∣
ξ=1
= lim
ξ→1
1−ξr
1−ξ
= r.
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From (13), after some minor manipulations using (12), we can rewrite P˜t′|k−1 as
P˜t′|k−1 = Fk+1:t′P˜k|k−1F
⊺
k+1:t′ +
n∑
i=1
Fk+i+1:t′Qk+iF
⊺
k+i+1:t′. (27)
Applying Lemma 1 to each term on the right hand side of (27), we obtain
P˜t′|k−1 
(
ξrνk +
r∑
i=1
ξr−iǫ
)
I,
where r = t′ − k. We therefore have
F
(
vecdiag
([
P˜t′|k−1
]
Q,Q
))
≥ f(r) , F
(
1|Q|
)(
ǫ
1− ξr
1− ξ
+ ξrνk
)
.
If ξ ≥ 1, f(r) ↑ ∞ as r →∞. On the other hand, if ξ < 1, we have
f(r + 1)− f(r) = F
(
1|Q|
)( ǫ
1− ξ
− νk
)
(ξr − ξr+1),
and f(r) ↑ F
(
1|Q|
)
ǫ
1−ξ
as r → ∞ if νk < ǫ/(1 − ξ). Therefore, under the conditions in the
proposition, by choosing the number of look-ahead steps rk to satisfy f(rk + 1) ≥ F(δ1|Q|),
ηt′|t(Ct) ≥ F(δ1|Q|) holds for all t′ ≥ t ≥ k, and the proposition is proved.
III. A SINGLE SENSOR
In this section, we consider the case where there is only a single sensor so that (P2) can be
optimized over all Ck ∈ R
M×N and 1 ≤ M ≤ N in a centralized setting. This gives the best
utility-privacy tradeoff and serves as a benchmark for the decentralized case that we consider in
Section IV. We first prove an elementary lemma.
Lemma 2. Suppose A ∈ RM×N with M ≤ N has full row rank, and B ∈ RN×N is a positive
definite matrix. Then,
A⊺ (ABA⊺)−1A = B−1/2UU⊺B−1/2, (28)
where U ∈ RN×M consists of the M right unit singular vectors associated with the M non-zero
singular values of AB1/2.
Proof: See Appendix A.
Suppose that Ck is full row rank (otherwise we can choose a smallerM). From Dk+n|k defined
in (19) and Lemma 2, we obtain
Dk+n|k = G
⊺
k+n|kT
−1/2
k UkU
⊺
kT
−1/2
k Gk+n|k, (29)
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where Uk consists of the M right unit singular vectors of CkT
1/2
k associated with its non-zero
singular values. For any n ≥ 0 and index set I, let
Θ
(I)
k+n|k =
[
T
−1/2
k Gk+n|k
]
:,I
[
T
−1/2
k Gk+n|k
]⊺
:,I
. (30)
Then, the utility function and privacy loss function in (22) and (23) can be expressed as functions
of Uk as follows:
uk(Uk) = Tr
(
U
⊺
kΘ
(P)
k|kUk
)
, (31)
ℓk+n|k(Uk) = F
([
Tr
(
U
⊺
kΘ
(Q1)
k+n|kUk
)
, . . . ,Tr
(
U
⊺
kΘ
(Q|Q|)
k+n|kUk
)]T)
. (32)
where we let Qi = {|P|+ i} be a set consisting of the index of the i-th private state such that
Q =
|Q|⋃
i=1
Qi.
Recall that F(x) = Ax. The Lagrangian L(Uk, {γn,f}, {λm}) of problem (P2) is then given
by
L(Uk, {γn,f}, {λm}) =
M∑
m=1
[Uk]
⊺
:,mΘ
(P)
k|k [Uk]:,m
−
rk∑
n=0
|F|∑
f=1
γn,f

 M∑
m=1
[Uk]
⊺
:,m
|Q|∑
j=1
A(f, j)Θ
(Qj)
k+n|k [Uk]:,m−
[A]If δ¯k+n|k
)
−
M∑
m=1
λm
(
[Uk]
⊺
:,m [Uk]:,m − 1
)
, (33)
where γn,f , n = 0, . . . , rk, f = 1, . . . , |F|, If = {f} and λm, m = 1, . . . ,M , are the Lagrange
multipliers. Differentiating L(Uk, {γn,f}, {λm}) with respect to [Uk]:,m and equating to zero
leads to
Θ(P)k|k −
rk∑
n=0
|F|∑
f=1
γn,f
|Q|∑
j=1
A(f, j)Θ
(Qj)
k+n|k

 [Uk]:,m = λm [Uk]:,m , m = 1, . . . ,M, (34)
which implies the objective of (P2) is maximized whenUk consists of theM unit eigenvectors of
Θ
(P)
k|k −
∑rk
n=0
∑|F|
f=1 γn,f
∑|Q|
j=1A(f, j)Θ
(Qj)
k+n|k associated with its M largest non-zero eigenvalues.
Observe that there is no need to consider zero eigenvalues in our solution as these do not change
the Lagrangian in (33). We see that both {Uk} and {λm} depend on {γn,f : n = 0, . . . , rk; f =
1, . . . , |F|} and M .
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Problem (P2) can be equivalently recast as
max
{γn,f }
uk(Uk) (35)
s.t. Tr

U⊺k
|Q|∑
j=1
A(f, j)Θ
(Qj)
k+n|kUk

 ≤ [A]If δ¯k+n|k,
n = 0, . . . , rk, f = 1, . . . , |F|,
Uk = eig 6=0

Θ(P)k|k −
rk∑
n=0
|F|∑
f=1
γn,f
|Q|∑
j=1
A(f, j)Θ
(Qj)
k+n|k,M

 ,
where eig 6=0 (A,M) denotes the matrix of eigenvectors of A corresponding to its M largest
non-zero eigenvalues. The optimization problem (35) can be solved using standard iterative
methods such as the interior-point method and sequential quadratic programming. However,
due to non-convexity, there is no guarantee of finding the global optimum using such iterative
methods. Comparing (35) (or equivalently (P2)) with original problem (P1), we can see that (P1)
is optimizing over a matrix Ck while (35) is optimizing over scalars {γn,f}. The optimal Uk (or
equivalently Ck) is then given by a closed-form expression in terms of {γn,f}. Hence, solving
(35) is computationally easier than solving (P1) directly.
Since
∑|Q|
j=1A(f, j)Θ
(Qj)
k+n|k are positive definite for every f = 1, . . . , |F|, the privacy loss
function ℓk+n|k(Uk) is increasing in M . Hence, the privacy constraint in (P2) may not be feasible
when M is large. To determine the optimal M , we have the following lemma.
Lemma 3. For two positive integers M+ and M− such that M+ > M−, suppose that {γ+n,f}
and {γ−n,f} are the solutions of (35) when M = M
+ and M = M−, respectively, and let U+k
and U−k be the corresponding Uk. Then, uk(U
+
k ) ≥ uk(U
−
k ).
Proof: Let
Φ−k = Θ
(P)
k|k −
rk∑
n=0
|F|∑
f=1
γ−n,f
|Q|∑
j=1
A(f, j)Θ
(Qj)
k+n|k,
Φ+k = Θ
(P)
k|k −
rk∑
n=0
|F|∑
f=1
γ+n,f
|Q|∑
j=1
A(f, j)Θ
(Qj)
k+n|k.
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Then, we have
uk(U
−
k ) = Tr
(
eig 6=0(Φ
−
k ,M
−)⊺Θ
(P)
k|k eig 6=0(Φ
−
k ,M
−)
)
≤ Tr
(
eig 6=0(Φ
−
k ,M
+)⊺Θ
(P)
k|k eig 6=0(Φ
−
k ,M
+)
)
,
≤ Tr
(
eig 6=0(Φ
+
k ,M
+)⊺Θ
(P)
k|k eig 6=0(Φ
+
k ,M
+)
)
= uk(U
+
k ),
where the first inequality follows because Θ
(P)
k|k  0,M
+ > M− and the last inequality follows
because the maximum of uk(U
+
k ) is achieved when γn,f = γ
+
n , for n = 0, . . . , rk, f = 1, . . . , |F|.
The lemma is now proved.
Lemma 3 shows that as long as the privacy constraints in (P2) are satisfied,M should be chosen
as large as possible to maximize uk. Let Φk = Θ
(P)
k|k−
∑rk
n=0
∑|F|
f=1 γn,f
∑|Q|
j=1A(f, j)Θ
(Qj)
k+n|k. Due
to the fact that rank(A + B) ≤ rank(A) + rank(B), rank (Φk) ≤ min(N, |P| + (rk + 1)|Q|),
thus we have M ≤ min(N, |P| + (rk + 1)|Q|). The distribution of the eigenvalues of Φk is
revealed by the following lemma.
Lemma 4. Let A  0 and B  0 be two N × N matrices whose ranks are rA and rB,
respectively. If N > rA + rB, C = A−B has at most rA positive eigenvalues and at most rB
negative eigenvalues.
Proof: See Appendix B
Suppose the eigenvalues of Φk are sorted in descending order as λ1, . . . , λN . Lemma 4 shows
that if N > |P|+(rk+1)|Q|, we should choose Uk to consist of the M unit eigenvectors of Φk
associated with its M largest non-zero eigenvalues in {λ1, . . . , λ|P|, λN−(rk+1)|Q|+1, . . . , λN}. If
N ≫ |P|+(rk+1)|Q|, the measurement can be significantly compressed without losing utility.
We summarize our solution approach to (P1) in Algorithm 1.
IV. DECENTRALIZED SENSORS
Suppose that there are S > 1 sensors and each sensor s makes a Ns×1 measurement. Dividing
the measurement model in (1b) into S parts, the measurement model at each sensor s is given
by
[zk]Is = [Hk]Is xk + [nk]Is , s = 1, . . . , S, (36)
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Procedure 1 Centralized solver for (P1)
Input: F(·), rk, δ, P˜k−1|k−1,Hk,Rk,Fk+n,Qk+n, n = 0, . . . , rk
Output: M,Ck = U
⊺
kT
−1/2
k
1: Compute {Θk+n|k} according to (30), and {F
(
δ¯k+n
)
} defined in (P2)
2: Initialize M = min({N, |P|+ (rk + 1)|Q|}
3: while M ≥ 1 do
4: For each M , find {γn,f} by solving (35).
5: Compute Uk by
eig 6=0

Θ(P)k|k −
rk∑
n=0
|F|∑
f=1
γn,f
|Q|∑
j=1
A(f, j)Θ
(Qj)
k+n|k,M

 .
6: if ℓk+n|k(Uk) ≤ F
(
δ¯k+n
)
, n = 0, . . . , rk then
7: break
8: end if
9: M ← M − 1
10: end while
where Is = {1 +
∑s−1
i=1 Ni, . . . ,
∑s
i=1Ni} and
∑S
s=1Ns = N . The quantities [zk]Is , [Hk]Is ∈
R
Ns×L and [nk]Is ∈ R
Ns are, respectively, the measurement made by sensor s, the measurement
matrix of sensor s, and the measurement noise.
Each sensor s applies its own compression [Ck]Js,Is ∈ R
Ms×Ns , which is a linear mapping
from a vector space with dimension Ns to one with dimension Ms < Ns, and Js = {1 +∑s−1
i=1 Mi, . . . ,
∑s
i=1Mi}, on its measurement before sending it to the fusion center. We have
[z˜k]Is = [Ck]Js,Is · [zk]Is
= [Ck]Js,Is [Hk]Is xk + [Ck]Js,Is [nk]Is . (37)
Relating the compression map at each sensor in (37) to the overall compression map in (7), we
see that the distributed implementation restricts the structure of the transformation matrix Ck to
be a block diagonal matrix whose diagonal entries are the transformation matrices [Ck]Js,Is , s =
1, . . . , S and the remaining entries are all zeros. The version of (P2) for decentralized sensors
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Ψk =


[Ck]J1,I1 [Tk]I1,I1 [Ck]
⊺
J1,I1
. . . [Ck]J1,I1 [Tk]I1,IS [Ck]
⊺
JS ,IS
...
. . .
...
[Ck]JS ,IS [Tk]IS ,I1 [Ck]
⊺
J1,I1
. . . [Ck]JS ,IS [Tk]JS ,IS [Ck]
⊺
JS ,IS

 . (39)
can then be formulated as follows:
max
Ck
uk(Ck) (P3)
s.t. ℓk+n|k(Ck) ≤ F
(
δ¯k+n
)
, n = 0, . . . , rk,
Ck = diag
(
[Ck]J1,I1 , . . . , [Ck]JS ,IS
)
.
We firstly rewrite (19) to express Dk+n|k in terms of [Ck]J1,I1 , . . . , [Ck]JS ,IS as follows:
Dk+n|k = G
⊺
k+n|kC
⊺
k
(
CkTkC
⊺
k+n|k
)−1
CkGk+n|k,
=
[[
Gk+n|k
]⊺
I1
[Ck]
⊺
J1,I1
, . . . ,
[
Gk+n|k
]⊺
IS
[Ck]
⊺
JS ,IS
]
Ψ−1k


[Ck]J1,I1
[
Gk+n|k
]
I1
...
[Ck]JS ,IS
[
Gk+n|k
]
IS

 , (38)
where Ψk is defined in (39).
To solve (P3) in a decentralized fashion, we aim to separate the objective into individual local
objective functions at each sensor. However, without additional assumptions and reformulation
of the objective, this is not possible due to the inverse of the matrix Ψk. In the following, we
consider two cases: 1) where there is no information exchange between sensors; and 2) where
sensors are allowed to broadcast messages sequentially to all other sensors. In both these cases,
we propose new objective functions that are separable.
A. With no information exchange between sensors
We assume that each sensor at time k only knows its own measurement model, i.e., [Hk]Is , and
the covariance matrix [Rk]Is,Is of the process noise [nk]Is at sensor s. To make the objective
function separable, we propose to ignore all the inter-sensor terms, i.e., [Tk]Ii,Ij , i 6= j, and
replace Ψk in (39) with the following approximation
diag
(
[Ck]I1,J1 [Tk]I1,I1 [Ck]
⊺
I1,J1
, . . . , [Ck]IS ,JS [Tk]IS ,IS [Ck]
⊺
IS ,JS
)
, (40)
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in which only the diagonal terms containing [Tk]Is,Is , s = 1, . . . , S are retained. Plugging (40)
in place of Ψk into (38) and using Lemma 2 yields
Dk+n|k ≈
S∑
s=1
[
Gk+n|k
]⊺
Is
[Ck]
⊺
Js,Is
(
[Ck]Js,Is [Tk]Is,Is [Ck]
⊺
Js,Is
)−1
[Ck]Js,Is
[
Gk+n|k
]
Is
,
=
S∑
s=1
[
Gk+n|k
]⊺
Is
[Tk]
−1/2
Is,Is
U
(s)
k U
(s)
k
⊺
[Tk]
−1/2
Is,Is
[
Gk+n|k
]
Is
, (41)
where U
(s)
k consists of the Ms right singular vectors associated with the Ms non-zero singular
values of [Ck]Js,Is [Tk]
1/2
Is,Is
and U
(s)
k
⊺
U
(s)
k = IMs . From (41), we can now write the utility gain
and privacy loss in (P3) approximately as
uk(Ck) ≈
S∑
s=1
u
(s)
k (U
(s)
k ), (42)
ℓk+n|k(Ck) ≈
S∑
s=1
ℓ
(s)
k+n|k(U
(s)
k ), (43)
where
u
(s)
k (U
(s)
k ) = Tr
(
U
(s)
k
⊺
Θ
(P,s)
k|k U
(s)
k
)
, (44)
ℓ
(s)
k+n|k(U
(s)
k ) = F
([
Tr
(
U
(s)
k
⊺
Θ
(Q1,s)
k+n|kU
(s)
k
)
, . . . ,Tr
(
U
(s)
k
⊺
Θ
(Q|Q|,s)
k+n|k U
(s)
k
)]T)
, (45)
and
Θ
(I,s)
k|k = [Tk]
−1/2
Is,Is
[
Gk|k
]
Is,I
[
Gk|k
]⊺
Is,I
[Tk]
−1/2
Is,Is
for any index set I. The local U(s)k , for each s = 1, . . . , S can be optimized separately by solving
the following problem at each sensor s using a procedure similiar to Algorithm 1:
max
U
(s)
k
u
(s)
k (U
(s)
k ) (P3.1)
s.t. ℓ
(s)
k+n|k(U
(s)
k ) ≤ F
(
δ¯
(s)
k+n
)
, n = 0, . . . , rk,
U
(s)
k
⊺
U
(s)
k = IMs,
where
δ¯
(s)
k+n = vecdiag
([
P˜
(s)
k+n|k−1
]
Q,Q
)
− δ(s)1|Q|
and
P˜
(s)
k+n|k−1 =Fk+1:k+nP˜
(s)
k|k−1F
⊺
k+1:k+n +
n∑
i=1
Fk+i+1:k+nQk+iF
⊺
k+i+1:k+n
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with P˜
(s)
k|k−1 computed based on local information only. Since we assume that sensors do not know
each other’s measurement statistics, they cannot coordinate amongst themselves to choose δ(s).
For simplicity, we choose δ/S ≤ δ(s) < minF
(
vecdiag
([
P˜
(s)
k+n|k−1
]
Q,Q
))
. Since (43) is an
approximation, there is no guarantee that solving (P3.1) at every sensor produces a global feasible
solution. This is mainly due to the lack of information exchange. However, this scheme can be
used to initialize a more sophisticated iterative scheme that we introduce in next subsection.
B. Sequential message broadcasts
In the formulation in the previous subsection, Ψk is approximated as a block diagonal matrix
in (40). However, the off-diagonal/inter-sensor terms in Ψk may not be negligible, and ignoring
them may compromise the privacy-utility tradeoff. In this subsection, we consider the case where
information is exchanged between sensors to facilitate optimization of the compression map at
each sensor.
We rewrite Dk+n|k in (38) to isolate sensor s’s compression map, [Ck]Is,Js , from the trans-
formations of the other sensors [Ck]J\s,I\s (see Appendix C for the derivation):
Dk+n|k =
[
Gk+n|k
]⊺
I\s
[Ck]
⊺
J\s,I\s
[Φk]
−1
J\s,J\s
[Ck]J\s,I\s
[
Gk+n|k
]
I\s
+
(
G
(s)
k+n|k
)⊺
U
(s)
k U
(s)
k
⊺
G
(s)
k+n|k −
(
G
(s)
k+n|k
)⊺
U
(s)
k U
(s)
k
⊺
G
(\s)
k+n|k
−
(
G
(\s)
k+n|k
)⊺
U
(s)
k U
(s)
k
⊺
G
(s)
k+n|k +
(
G
(\s)
k+n|k
)⊺
U
(s)
k U
(s)
k
⊺
G
(\s)
k+n|k, (46)
where U
(s)
k consists of the Ms right unit singular vectors of [Ck]Is,Js
(
T
(s)
k
)1/2
associated with
its non-zero singular values and
T
(s)
k = [Tk]Is,Is − [Tk]Is,I\s [Ck]
⊺
J\s,I\s
[Φk]
−1
J\s,J\s
[Ck]J\s,I\s [Tk]
⊺
Is,I\s
,
G
(s)
k+n|k =
(
T
(s)
k
)−1/2 [
Gk+n|k
]
Is
,
G
(\s)
k+n|k =
(
T
(s)
k
)−1/2
[Tk]Is,I\s [Ck]
⊺
J\s,I\s
[Φk]
−1
J\s,J\s
[Ck]J\s,I\s
[
Gk+n|k
]
I\s
,
I\s = I1 ∪ . . . ∪ Is−1 ∪ Is+1 ∪ . . . ∪ IS.
For any n ≥ 0 and any index set I, let
Ξ
(I,s)
k+n|k =
[
G
(s)
k+n|k
]
:,I
[
G
(s)
k+n|k
]⊺
:,I
−
[
G
(\s)
k+n|k
]
:,I
[
G
(s)
k+n|k
]⊺
:,I
−
[
G
(s)
k+n|k
]
:,I
[
G
(\s)
k+n|k
]⊺
:,I
+
[
G
(\s)
k+n|k
]
:,I
[
G
(\s)
k+n|k
]⊺
:,I
.
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Then, the utility uk and privacy loss ℓk+n|k for n ≥ 0 can be rewritten as
uk =Tr
([
Dk+n|k
]
P,P
)
=Tr
(
U
(s)
k
⊺
Ξ
(P,s)
k|k U
(s)
k
)
+ Tr
([[
Gk+n|k
]⊺
I\s
[Ck]
⊺
J\s,I\s
[Φk]
−1
J\s,J\s
[Ck]J\s,I\s
[
Gk+n|k
]
I\s
]
P,P
)
,
and
ℓk+n|k
=F
(
vecdiag
([
Dk+n|k
]
Q,Q
))
=F
([
Tr
(
U
(s)
k
⊺
Ξ
(Q1,s)
k+n|kU
(s)
k
)
, . . . ,Tr
(
U
(s)
k
⊺
Ξ
(Q|Q|,s)
k+n|k U
(s)
k
)]T)
+ F
(
vecdiag
([[
Gk+n|k
]⊺
I\s
[Ck]
⊺
J\s,I\s
[Φk]
−1
J\s,J\s
[Ck]J\s,I\s
[
Gk+n|k
]
I\s
]
Q,Q
))
.
Since uk and ℓk+n|k depend on some information that are not available locally at each sensor,
the following information need to be shared between the sensors:
1) [Ck]Js,Is , the transformations applied locally at sensor s;
2) [Hk]Is , the local measurement matrix of sensor s;
3) [Rk]Is,Js , the covariance matrix of the local measurement noise at sensor s;
4) [Rk]Is,J\s , the correlation between the local measurement noise at sensor s and that of other
sensors.
The first item is used to construct [Ck]J\s,I\s while the last three items are needed to compute
G
(\s)
k+n|k at sensor s. However, the correlations between the noise measured at different sensors
maybe difficult to know a priori in practice if the measurement are made separately. In such
a case, we assume the noise measured at different sensors are independent, i.e., [Rk]Ii,Jj =
0, ∀i 6= j.
To solve (P3), we propose an alternating optimization procedure. We consider a sequential
message passing schedule: each sensor in turn transmits messages to all other sensors. Suppose
the order of transmission is predefined as 1, 2, · · · , S. Sensor s finds [Ck]
{i}
Js,Is
at iteration i
using
[
[Ck]
{i}
J1,I1
, . . . , [Ck]
{i}
Js−1,Is−1
, [Ck]
{i−1}
Js+1,Is+1
, . . . , [Ck]
{i−1}
JS ,IS
]
as [Ck]J\s,I\s . The details are
summarized in Algorithm 2.
Proposition 2. In Algorithm 2, suppose that u{i}k is the utility gain at iteration i. Then u
{i}
k
converges under the sequential schedule.
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Proof. For each sensor s and iteration i, let u(s)k ([Ck]
{i}
J1,I1
, . . . , [Ck]
{i}
Js,Is
, [Ck]
{i−1}
Js+1,Is+1
, [Ck]
{i−1}
JS ,IS
)
be the utility at sensor s in iteration i under the sequential schedule. We have
u
{i−1}
k =u
(S)
k ([Ck]
{i−1}
J1,I1
, . . . , [Ck]
{i−1}
JS ,IS
), iteration i− 1 at sensor S
≤u(1)k ([Ck]
{i}
J1,I1
, [Ck]
{i−1}
J2,I2
, . . . , [Ck]
{i−1}
JS ,IS
), iteration i at sensor 1
...
≤u(s)k ([Ck]
{i}
J1,I1
, . . . , [Ck]
{i}
Js,Is
, [Ck]
{i−1}
Js+1,Is+1
, [Ck]
{i−1}
JS ,IS
), iteration i at sensor s
...
≤u(S)k ([Ck]
{i}
J1,I1
, . . . , [Ck]
{i}
JS ,IS
), iteration i at sensor S
=u
{i}
k ,
where the above inequalities follow because for each sensor s, [Ck]
{i}
Js,Is
is obtained by maxi-
mizing the objective of (P3) given [Ck]
{i}
J1,I1
, . . . , [Ck]
{i}
Js−1,Is−1
, [Ck]
{i−1}
Js+1,Is+1
, . . . [Ck]
{i−1}
JS ,IS
. Since
u
{i}
k ≤ Tr
([
P˜k|k−1
]
P,P
)
for all i ≥ 1, the proposition is proved.
Procedure 2 Distributed algorithm: sequential update schedule at time step k
Input: [Ck]
{0}
Js,Is
= U
(s)
k
⊺
(
T
(s)
k
)−1/2
, ∀s with M{0}s ,U
(s)
k obtained by solving (P3.1)
Output: [Ck]
{NumIter}
Js,Is
, s = 1, . . . , S
1: Num-iter ← 1 {iteration index}
2: while |u{NumIter}k − u
{NumIter−1}
k | ≥ ǫ do
3: for s = 1 to S do
4: Broadcast [Ck]
{i−1}
Js,Is
,
5: Broadcast
{
[Hk]Is , [Rk]Is,Is
}
once only at i = 1
6: Receive [Ck]
{i−1}
J\s,I\s
,
7: Receive
{
[Hk]I\s , [Rk]I\s,I\s
}
once only at i = 1
8: Update [Ck]
{i}
Js,Is
by solving (P3) where
[Ck]J\s,I\s =
[
[Ck]
{i}
J1,I1
, . . . , [Ck]
{i}
Js−1,Is−1
, [Ck]
{i−1}
Js+1,Is+1
, . . . , [Ck]
{i−1}
JS ,IS
]
.
9: end for
10: NumIter ← NumIter +1
11: end while
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Fig. 1 summarizes the relationships between the problem formulations (P0)-(P3) in Section III
and Section IV.
P0 P1
P3P3.1
P2 (35)
Equiv.
D
ec
en
tr
a
li
ze
d
No info. exch.
Equiv.
Alg. 2
rk = 0
Privacy constraints on rk steps ahead
Alg. 1
Iter. optimizer
Seq. optimizer
Initialize
(approximation)
Fig. 1. Relationships between the problem formulations (P0)-(P3).
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we present simulation studies to understand the impact of different parameters
on the utility-privacy tradeoff in both the centralized (single sensor) and distributed cases. We
compare our compressive privacy scheme with the IB [48], PF [50], and CP [21] privacy
mechanisms. We use the following settings for all the simulations in this section (unless otherwise
stated): the entries of Hk at each time step are drawn independently from N (0, 1), Rk = IN ,
P0|0 = 0.01IL, |P| = 4, and |Q| = 4. Each data point shown in the following figures is averaged
over 50 independent experiments.
A. Centralized case
We first consider the centralized case where there is a single sensor. Recall that τk and ηk, which
are defined in (8) and (9), denote the public error trace and private error function, respectively.
The variable rk determines the number of future time steps that are considered in (P1), and when
rk = 0, only the current time step is considered. We choose (10) to be the private error function
for Fig. 2 and Fig. 4 so that |F| = 1 and F(δ1|Q|) = |Q|δ. We let (11) to be the private error
function for Fig. 3 so that |F| = |Q| and F(δ1|Q|) = δ1|Q|.
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Fig. 2. The public error trace τk and privacy error trace ηk vs. the privacy threshold |Q|δ at k = 20.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Fig. 3. The public error trace τk and the minimum of private error variances min(ηk) vs. the privacy threshold δ at k = 20
where the element-wise privacy constraint is considered and Qk = 5IN .
Fig. 2 demonstrates the impact of δ on τk and ηk with increasing δ and Qk = 2IN . We
randomly generate each Fk for all k ≥ 1 by Fk = UkDkV
⊺
k where Uk and Vk contain the
orthonormal bases of two randomly generated matrices, and Dk is a diagonal matrix whose
diagonal entries are uniformly drawn from [1, 1.2]. The results shown are at time step k = 20.
Recall in Algorithm 1 that we keep reducing the compression dimension M until feasibility of
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the privacy constraint is achieved. In the case where rk is too small, the privacy constraint cannot
be satisfied even when M is reduced to 0, which implies that the information from previous time
steps less than k allows us to infer the private states at time k better than the privacy constraint.
In such a case, we set M = 0 in our simulation result. We see from Fig. 2 that ηk < |Q|δ for
rk = 0 when δ is sufficiently large.
In Figs. 2 and 3, we also show the case where rk = 1 and rk = rk,⋆ = min
r≥0
{r : 2r + νk ≥ δ}−
1 (see (25) of Proposition 1 where ξ = 1 and ǫ = 2). We see that in these cases, the privacy
constraint ηk ≥ |Q|δ is always satisfied. Moreover, we can also see in Figs. 2 and 3 that the
estimation of public states is clearly compromised as δ increases.
Recall that matrices Fk+n, for n = 0, . . . , rk, play important roles in multi-step utility-privacy
tradeoffs. To quantify the impact of Fk+n, we let ω ∈ [0, 1] and choose
Fk+n =

 ω [F]P,P (1− ω) [F]P,Q
(1− ω) [F]Q,P ω [F]Q,Q

 ,
where the entries of F for each Fk+n are drawn independently from N (0, 1), and each row of
F is normalized to have unit norm. A smaller ω means that the public and private states are
more correlated in the next time step. In Fig. 4, we set ω = 0.2 to be small. When rk = 0, both
public and private error traces evolve in a zigzag pattern and the privacy constraint ηk ≥ |Q|δ
is violated at every other time step. This is due to the high correlation between the public states
[xk]P at time k and the private states [xk+1]Q at time k + 1. For example, a small public error
trace τk at time k yields a small Tr
([
P˜k+1|k
]
Q,Q
)
at time k+1, which leads to a small private
error trace ηk+1 at time k + 1. On the other hand, if we set rk = 1, the additional privacy
constraint ηk+1 ≥ |Q|δ ensures that ηk ≥ |Q|δ is feasible from k = 2 onwards.
B. Comparison amongst compressive privacy-preserving techniques
If the state and process noises in (1) are Gaussian random variables, then IB [48], PF [50], and
CP [21] can be regarded as compressive privacy-preserving techniques with different utility and
privacy measures. In this subsection, we briefly review these methods adapted to our problem
formulation and compare them with our proposed approach, where for every time k, we let
rk = 0 and choose the private error trace (10) as the privacy measure for our proposed approach.
Since |F| = 1, we write γn,1 in (33) as γk to use the same symbol as the tradeoff parameters of
the methods we compare with.
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Fig. 4. The public error trace τk and private error trace ηk over 20 time steps where Qk = 2IN , |Q|δ = 15 and rk = 0, 1.
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Fig. 5. Comparison of IB, PF, CP and proposed scheme in terms of τk while Hk is a random matrix and ηk = 25. We set
Qk = 4I4 and rk = 0.
(i) IB finds the optimal compressive matrix Ck by
min
Ck
I(zk;Ckzk)− γkI(Ckzk;yk),
where yk = [xk]P and γk is a positive constant. The optimal compression is given by
Ck = [α1v1, . . . , αMvM ]
⊺ ,
27
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
Fig. 6. Comparison of IB, PF, CP and proposed scheme in terms of τk while Hk is an orthogonal matrix and ηk = 25. We set
Qk = 4I4 and rk = 0.
where vi, for i = 1, . . . ,M are the left eigenvectors of(
Tk −Σzk,yk
[
P˜k|k−1
]−1
P,P
Tk
)
T−1k
with Σzk,yk = [Hk]:,P
[
P˜k|k−1
]
P,P
+ [Hk]:,Q
[
P˜k|k−1
]
Q,P
, sorted by their corresponding
ascending eigenvalues λ1, . . . , λM , and
αi =
√
γk(1− λi)− 1
λiv
⊺
iTkvi
.
(ii) PF finds the optimal compressive matrix Ck by
max
Ck
I(zk;Ckzk)− γkI(Ckzk;yk),
where yk = [xk]Q and γk is a positive constant. The optimal compression is given by
Ck = [α1v1, . . . , αMvM ]
⊺ ,
where vi, for i = 1, . . . ,M are the left eigenvectors of(
Tk −Σzk,yk
[
P˜k|k−1
]−1
Q,Q
Tk
)
T−1k
with Σzk,yk = [Hk]:,P
[
P˜k|k−1
]
P,Q
+ [Hk]:,Q
[
P˜k|k−1
]
Q,Q
, sorted by their corresponding
descending eigenvalues λ1, . . . , λM .
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(iii) CP finds the optimal Ck by
max
Ck
I(Γ
(P)
k zk;Ckzk)− γkI(Γ
(Q)
k zk;Ckzk),
where Γ
(P)
k =
(
[Hk]
⊥
:,Q
)⊺
and Γ
(Q)
k =
(
[Hk]
⊥
:,P
)⊺
. The optimal solution of Ck is given by
C∗k = eig (Ωk − γkΠk,Tk,M) ,
where eig (A,B,M) is a matrix consisting of the M principal generalized unit eigenvectors
of the matrix pencil (A,B), and
Ωk = Tk
(
Γ
(P)
k
)⊺ (
Γ
(P)
k Tk
(
Γ
(P)
k
)⊺)−1
Γ
(P)
k Tk,
Πk = Tk
(
Γ
(Q)
k
)⊺ (
Γ
(Q)
k Tk
(
Γ
(Q)
k
)⊺)−1
Γ
(Q)
k Tk.
Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 compares the private error trace τk and private error trace ηk of the different
schemes IB, PF, CP, and our proposed approach where rk = 0. The tradeoff parameter γk
and the dimension M are chosen to make ηk equal to (or as close as possible to) |Q|δ = 25
when k is large. The entries of Fk are drawn independently from N (0, 1), and each row of
Fk is normalized to have unit norm. In Fig. 5 where Hk is a random matrix, we see that our
proposed scheme, whose privacy metric is estimation variance, yields the lowest τk while CP
yields slightly higher τk and IB and PF yield the highest τk. In CP, the utility projection Γ
(P)
k
and privacy projection Γ
(Q)
k cannot capture, respectively, the entire utility subspace [Hk]:,P and
the entire privacy subspace [Hk]:,Q, unless Hk is an orthogonal matrix. Fig. 6 shows the results
when Hk is an orthogonal matrix. We see that τk in our proposed scheme is always lower than
that in CP while ηk ≥ |Q|δ from k = 3 onwards for both schemes.
C. Decentralized sensors
In this subsection, we consider the case with multiple decentralized sensors. Let Qk = 4IL,
rk = rk,⋆ in (25), δ = 3 and N = 30. We randomly generate each Fk for all k ≥ 1 so that
its singular values are uniformly drawn from [1, 1.2], and use (11) as the private error function.
Fig. 7 uses S = 3 sensors and each sensor s’s measurement has dimension Ns = N/S = 10,
which is greater than the number of unknowns L = 8, whereas Fig. 8 uses S = 5 sensors with
Ns = N/S = 6, which is less than L thus making each sensor an under-determined system.
Comparing Fig. 7 where Ns = 10 and Fig. 8 where Ns = 6, we notice that the compression
matrix of Ns = 6 is a submatrix of the compression matrix of Ns = 10. Thus, τk for Ns = 10
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is less than that for Ns = 6. In Figs. 7 and 8, while the sequential scheme yields min(ηk) = δ
for all time steps, the "no info. exch." scheme yields min(ηk) < δ thus no privacy guarantee
is ensured. In Fig. 8 where each sensor is an under-determined system, the estimation errors of
both public and private states are infinitely large at each sensor. Therefore, the no information
exchange scheme at each sensor s will choose Ms to be Ns for all s = 1, . . . , S, i.e., no
compression is used. As a result, after aggregating the measurements from all sensors at fusion
center, the estimation errors of both public and private states are as low as the unsanitized ones.
This explains why both min(ηk) and τk obtained using the no information exchange scheme are
very small in Fig. 8.
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Fig. 7. The performance of the sequential scheme where Num-iter = 10 and N1, . . . , N3 = 10, in terms of public error trace
τk and the minimum private error variance min(ηk).
Fig. 9, which uses the same settings as in Fig. 7, shows how τk and min(ηk(Ck)) evolve
over the time steps k for the sequential scheme. Both τk and min(ηk(Ck)) converge after a few
iterations.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
A. Privacy-aware localization
We conduct an experiment using DecaWave UWB sensors [81] for localization. We place 5
anchor nodes at known locations p(A) ∈ R2×5 and estimate a mobile node’s 2-dimensional (2D)
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Fig. 8. The performance of the sequential scheme where Num-iter = 10 and N1, . . . , N5 = 6, in terms of public error trace
τk and the minimum private error variance min(ηk).
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Fig. 9. Convergence of τk and min(ηk(Ck)) using Algorithm 2, where S = 3, N1, . . . , N3 = 10 and δ = 3. The results
shown are for time step k = 20.
trajectory. The mobile node’s state at time k is denoted as xk = [vk, θk, px,k, py,k]
⊺
. The public
state [xk]P = vk is the mobile node’s speed while the private state [xk]Q = [θk, px,k, py,k]
⊺
contains
the node’s heading and 2D location. The measurements are anchor-to-mobile ranges, which are
a non-linear function of the state: zk = hk(xk)+nk. We use the extended Kalman filter (EKF) in
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our estimation procedure. At each time k, we linearize hk and fk around the estimate xˆk|k−1 and
define the measurement matrix and the transition matrix, respectively, to beHk =
∂hk(x)
∂x
∣∣∣
x=xˆk|k−1
and Fk =
∂fk(x)
∂x
∣∣∣
x=xˆk−1|k−1
, where fk(xk) = [vk, θk, px,k +∆vk cos θk, py,k +∆vk sin θk]
⊺
with
∆ = 0.1 being the sampling interval. The transition matrix is approximated by
Fk =


1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
∆ cos θˆk−1 −∆sin θˆk−1vˆk−1 1 0
∆ sin θˆk−1 ∆cos θˆk−1vˆk−1 1 0

 .
The measurement zk ∈ R5×1 contains range measurements between the mobile node and
anchor nodes with
[zk]i =
∥∥∥[p(A)]
:,i
− [xk]Q
∥∥∥+ [nk]i , i = 1, . . . , 5,
where ‖ · ‖ denotes the Euclidean norm. Under the EKF framework, we let the measurement
matrix Hk ∈ R5×4 to be given by
[Hk]i = −

0, 0,
[
p(A)
]
1,i
−
[
xˆk|k−1
]
3∥∥∥[p(A)]:,i − [xˆk|k−1]Q
∥∥∥ ,
[
p(A)
]
2,i
−
[
xˆk|k−1
]
4∥∥∥[p(A)]:,i − [xˆk|k−1]Q
∥∥∥

 , i = 1, . . . , 5,
where xˆk|k−1 is the predicted state before measurements at time k. Recall that we want to protect
the mobile node’s location while estimating its velocity, which however is not directly observed.
In Fig. 11 and Fig. 10, we consider the centralized setting where the mobile node collects the
ranging measurements and sanitizes them before sending to a server. We set P0 = 0.01I4 and
Rk = 0.04I5,Qk = 0.04I4, and rk = 0 for all time steps k. The private error function used is
(10).
The mobile node’s state is estimated over 318 time steps with or without compressive saniti-
zation. We let |Q|δ = 2. The trajectory estimated with compressive sanitization (red crosses in
Fig. 10) is noticeably distorted as compared to the ground true line (black line) thus the private
information is protected whereas the private information is exposed in the trajectory estimated
without compressive sanitization (blue dashes), which matches the ground truth line well. On
the other hand, the public information (red line in Fig. 11), i.e., the speed of the mobile node
matches fairly well with the unsanitized one (black line). This experiment shows the proposed
approach is also applicable to non-linear dynamical systems that can be approximated using the
EKF framework.
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Fig. 10. Estimation of the mobile node’s locations (private states).
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Fig. 11. Estimation of the mobile node’s speed (public states).
B. Privacy-aware human activity recognition
In this section, we test our approach using the public data set for human activity recognition
(HAR) from [82]. We consider three activity labels: walking, walking upstairs and walking
downstairs, in which walking is the public label while walking upstairs/downstairs are the private
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labels (e.g., these two activities can reveal how many floors the person’s house has). We evaluate
the impact of all 561 features HAR provides on the public or private activity labels using 10-fold
cross-validation and rank them according to information gain. This process is automated using
WEKA [83]. We choose five features (|P| = 5) that have the biggest impact on walking and
five features (|Q| = 5) that have the biggest impact on walking upstairs/downstairs. The public
features and private features are mutually exclusive. There are 30 subjects involved in HAR. For
each subject, we update all L = 10 features successively at each time step using our approach,
where we set P0|0 = 0.01I10, Fk = I10,Qk = 0.2I10, and Hk ∈ R
Nk×L to be an identity matrix
IL with its rows being randomly dropped with probability of 0.8 at each time step to simulate
lossy transmission, and Rk = 0.1INk . Fig. 12 shows the public error trace τk and private error
trace ηk where we choose (10) to be the private error function for Fig. 12 so that |F| = 1 and
F(δ1|Q|) = |Q|δ and δ = 1 and results are obtained by averaging over 30 subjects. We see that
our framework is able to generate a low public error trace τk and a high private error trace ηk.
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Fig. 12. The public error trace τk and private error trace ηk for estimating public features and private features, respectively.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have investigated the use of compressive privacy schemes in a LDS to
prevent the fusion center from estimating a set of private states accurately while still allowing it
to estimate a set of public states with good accuracy. We developed an optimization framework to
34
find the optimal compression matrix at each time step to achieve an optimal tradeoff between the
utility at the current time step and privacy protection at multiple steps in the future. We showed
that this approach allows us to ensure the same level of privacy in all future time steps in a LDS.
We develop algorithms to solve for the optimal compression matrix in both the centralized and
decentralized settings. For the decentralized case, we proposed the sequential update schedule.
Extensive simulations are performed to verify the performance of our proposed approaches with
comparisons to other methods in the literature, which are however not designed for LDS. Two
empirical experiments are conducted to verify that our proposed approach on real-world time
series data.
In this paper, we have not considered the case where side information at each time step may be
used in privacy attacks to infer the private states. In our formulation, such initial side information
can be captured in the prior distribution at time step 0. It is of interest in future research work to
consider the availability of side information at every time step. Moreover, our approach is model
dependent and thus accurate measurement and state models are essential for our approach.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
Let A′ = AB1/2. Let VΛU⊺ be the truncated version of the singular value decomposition
(SVD) of A′, where Λ ∈ RM×M is a diagonal matrix with non-zero singular values being its
diagonal elements, V ∈ RM×M contains the M left singular vectors, and U is as defined in
the lemma statement. Substituting the SVD of A′ into the left-hand side of (28), we obtain the
right-hand side. This completes the proof.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 4
Let {λA,i, i = 1, . . . , N} and {λ−B,i, i = 1, . . . , N} denote the eigenvalues of A and −B,
respectively, sorted in descending order. The eigenvalues of C, denoted as {λC,i, i = 1, . . . , N}
sorted in descending order, satisfy Weyl’s inequality:
λA,N + λ−B,i ≤ λC,i ≤ λA,i + λ−B,1, i = 1, . . . , N.
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Since N > rA + rB, λA,i = 0 for i > rA and λ−B,i = 0 for i ≤ N − rB. Then, we have
0 ≤ λC,i ≤ λA,i, 1 ≤ i ≤ rA,
λC,i = 0, rA + 1 ≤ i ≤ N − rB
λ−B,i ≤ λC,i ≤ 0, N − rB + 1 ≤ i ≤ N.
The proof is now complete.
APPENDIX C
DERIVATION OF (46)
Let Πi,j be a permutation matrix that swaps the ith and the jth columns of the identity matrix
IS . Then, right multiplying a matrix by Πs→1 = Πs,s−1Πs−1,s−2 · · ·Π2,1 ends up moving the
sth column of this matrix to its 1st column and it’s easy to verify that Πs→1Π
⊺
s→1 = Is. In what
follows, we firstly show that Dk+n|k does not depend on the order of sensors and then separate
the terms depending on [Ck]Js,Is in Dk+n|k from the terms depending on [Ck]J\s,I\s . From (38),
we have
Dk+n|k =
[[
Gk+n|k
]⊺
I1
[Ck]
⊺
J1,I1
, . . . ,
[
Gk+n|k
]⊺
IS
[Ck]
⊺
Js,Is
]
Πs→1
Π
⊺
s→1Ψk
−1Πs→1Π
⊺
s→1


[Ck]J1,I1
[
Gk+n|k
]
I1
...
[Ck]Js,Is
[
Gk+n|k
]
IS

 ,
=
[[
Gk+n|k
]⊺
I1
[Ck]
⊺
J1,I1
, . . . ,
[
Gk+n|k
]⊺
IS
[Ck]
⊺
Js,Is
]
Πs→1
(Π⊺s→1ΨkΠs→1)
−1
Π
⊺
s→1


[Ck]J1,I1
[
Gk+n|k
]
I1
...
[Ck]Js,Is
[
Gk+n|k
]
IS

 ,
=
[[
Gk+n|k
]⊺
Is
[Ck]
⊺
Js,Is
,
[
Gk+n|k
]⊺
I\s
[Ck]
⊺
J\s,I\s
]

 [Ck]Js,Is [Tk]Is,Is [Ck]⊺Js,Is [Ck]Js,Is [Tk]Is,I\s [Ck]⊺J\s,I\s
[Ck]J\s,I\s [Tk]
⊺
Is,I\s
[Ck]
⊺
Js,Is
[Φk]I\s,I\s


−1

 [Ck]Js,Is [Gk+n|k]Is
[Ck]J\s,I\s
[
Gk+n|k
]
I\s

 ,
=
[
Gk+n|k
]⊺
Is
[Ck]
⊺
Js,Is
(
[Ck]Js,Is T
(s)
k [Ck]
⊺
Js,Is
)−1
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[Ck]Js,Is
[
Gk+n|k
]
Is
−
[
Gk+n|k
]⊺
Is
[Ck]
⊺
Js,Is
(
[Ck]Js,Is T
(s)
k [Ck]
⊺
Js,Is
)−1
[Ck]Js,Is [Tk]Is,I\s [Ck]
⊺
J\s,I\s
[Φk]
−1
I\s,I\s
[Ck]J\s,I\s
[
Gk+n|k
]
I\s
−
[
Gk+n|k
]⊺
I\s
[Ck]
⊺
J\s,I\s
[Φk]
−1
I\s,I\s
[Ck]J\s,I\s [Tk]
⊺
Is,I\s
[Ck]
⊺
Js,Is
(
[Ck]Js,Is T
(s)
k [Ck]
⊺
Js,Is
)−1
[Ck]Js,Is
[
Gk+n|k
]
Is
+
[
Gk+n|k
]⊺
I\s
[Ck]
⊺
J\s,I\s
[Φk]
−1
I\s,I\s
[Ck]J\s,I\s [Tk]
⊺
Is,I\s
[Ck]
⊺
Js,Is
(
[Ck]Js,Is T
(s)
k [Ck]
⊺
Js,Is
)−1
[Ck]Js,Is [Tk]Is,I\s
[Ck]
⊺
J\s,I\s
[Φk]
−1
I\s,I\s
[Ck]J\s,I\s
[
Gk+n|k
]
I\s
+
[
Gk+n|k
]⊺
I\s
[Ck]
⊺
J\s,I\s
[Φk]
−1
I\s,I\s
[Ck]J\s,I\s
[
Gk+n|k
]
I\s
,
where the last equality follows from the matrix inversion lemma. Applying Lemma 2, we obtain
(46).
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